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Autonomous system models of interoception describe perception of bodily sensations
as an active process in which the brain generates and tests hypotheses about the
body on the basis of proximal information. This view of perception as inference allows
a new perspective on the role of affect in perception. Affect and interoception are closely
linked, but processes underlying this link are poorly understood. We suggest that a
predictive coding perspective allows acknowledging affect as integral part of information
processing. We outline how affect may intrinsically modify processes of interoception by
acting as threshold mechanism in stimulus grouping and information compression. We
outline how well-established methods, for example, from categorization research may
allow quantifying this influence of affect on perception in empirical tests of predictive
coding models. We discuss how this may enrich the study of the relationship between
affect and interoception and may have important clinical relevance.
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Introduction
How accurate are people when they describe their internal states? This is a question of high clinical
relevance, especially in amedical context where report of bodily symptoms has important diagnostic
and therapeutic implications. Symptoms such as pain or dyspnea cannot be measured by objective
means, but only by self-report (Parshall et al., 2012). Unfortunately, we are apparently poor judges
of what is going on inside of our body (Wiebe et al., 1994; Janssens et al., 2009; Petersen et al.,
2011). Studies estimate that depending on disease domain up to 81.6% of patients report at least one
symptom that cannot be related to physiological dysfunction (Hiller et al., 2006). This is frustrating
for both, patients and medical doctors, since distress communicated by patients is usually profound
and genuine (Brown, 2004; Edwards et al., 2010). On the other hand, a high number of individuals
with severe pathology does not report symptoms and does not seek medical help. This can have
serious consequences, for example (among other), in the case of stroke (e.g., Lacy et al., 2001), pain
(e.g., Yong et al., 2001; Gagliese, 2009), or respiratory disease (e.g., Petersen et al., 2014a).
Anxiety and negative affect are usually treated as prime suspects in research on bias in the
perception of bodily sensations. As state and trait, they seem to play a prominent role in the
perception of the world within and outside the body (Watson and Pennebaker, 1989; Van den Bergh
et al., 2004; Cisler and Koster, 2010). A meta-analysis on attentional bias toward threatening visual
stimuli in anxiety reports an aggregated effect size of d = 0.45 (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Effects
of anxiety on the perception of heartbeat are even more robust and a review reports a weighted
mean effect size of d = 0.62 for anxiety sensitivity, indicating that individuals high in fear of
bodily sensations are more sensitive to perceive their heartbeat (Domschke et al., 2010). At the
same time, negative affect and anxiety are positively related to an interoceptive bias and a tendency
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for catastrophizing interpretations (Watson and Pennebaker,
1989; Van den Bergh et al., 2004; Leeuw et al., 2007).
Despite robust empirical evidence that anxiety has an effect on
perception and interoception, recent reviews agree that there is a
problematic lack of theory-driven studies onwhy and how anxiety
affects attention, information processing, and self-report, in other
words on how anxiety becomes part of the perceptual process
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler and Koster, 2010). In the following,
we discuss (1) how to define accurate perception, (2) how recently
developed theories of perception as hypotheses testing may allow
to integrate affect as part of perceptual algorithms, and (3) how
these models can be tested with validated research paradigms.
The perception of bodily sensations is a particularly interesting
field to conceptualize affect as part of the perceptual process.
Bodily sensations interact closely with emotions (Dunn et al.,
2010). Furthermore, they are often complex and ambiguous,
involving multiple afferent sources (Parshall et al., 2012). They
can also be ambiguous because of a low signal to noise ratios (e.g.,
heartbeat) or because of low perceived predictability (Browning
et al., 2015; Seidel et al., 2015). We suggest below that affect
is part of the perceptual processes by guiding disambiguation.
Thus, ambiguity of bodily sensations make them an example par
excellence to outline our ideas. We suggest, however, that the
model presented here is not restricted to the perception of the
body, but can be applied also to other forms of perception.
The Quest for Truth in the Perception of
Bodily Sensations
Truth is a matter of definition. Different perspectives have been
suggested such as correspondence, consensus, and pragmatic truth
(Kruglanski, 1989) or criterion and construct validity (Cronbach
and Meehl, 1955). The correspondence theory of truth defines
accuracy as correlation between a percept and an external
criterion. The consensus theory of truth regards perception as
validated if it is socially shared, for example, if patients agree with
other patients or with health care professionals about symptoms
and symptom severity. Correspondence and consensus validity
are usually low in the perception of bodily sensations (e.g.,
Macquart-Moulin et al., 1997; Fallone et al., 2004; Hiller et al.,
2006; Janssens et al., 2009; Riegel et al., 2010) and this constitutes
a problem for the diagnostic process. In a biomedical model,
symptoms need to be “proven” by physiological measures.
This emphasis on external criteria contrasts with a ‘pragmatic’
psychophysics perspective (Thurstone, 1927; Killian, 1985), with
neural models of information processing (Friston, 2005; Barrett
and Simmons, 2015), andwith philosophicalmodels of perception
(Hume, 1739/2007; James, 1909/1974; Hohwy, 2012). These
models agree that the brain cannot access the world—including
the peripheral body- directly, but needs to rely on patterns of brain
activity (Hohwy, 2012). Working with proximal stimulation, the
brain creates a statisticalmodel of the body in theworld that allows
to make inferences about causes and predictions about future
stimulations (Friston, 2005; Hohwy, 2012). In this perspective
“reason must be considered as a kind of cause of which truth is
the natural effect” (Hume, 1739/2007, p. 121) and not vice versa.
The brain relies on pragmatic truth which optimizes the “truth’s
cash-value in experiential terms” (James, 1909/1974, p. 5). This
inference process does not necessarily reach conscious awareness,
but is considered an automatic process running on different
hierarchical levels of information processing (e.g., Friston, 2005;
Edwards et al., 2012).
Perception of bodily sensations can become gradually
independent from physiological changes, creating interoceptive
“illusions” such as nocebo or placebo effects (Van den Bergh
et al., 2002; Büchel et al., 2014; Constantinou et al., 2015). To
assume that perception of placebo and nocebo effects is flawed
is a misconception resulting from confusing cause and effect
(Hume, 1739/2007). Despite low correspondence/consensus
validity, pragmatic validity can be high (Cronbach and Meehl,
1955) and related to an overall optimization of perception and
coping in terms of a cost/benefit strategy (Huttenlocher et al.,
2000). Only if statistical models of the body are not updated
in response to error feedback, suboptimal models may lead to
suboptimal perception and coping, as it has been suggested for
medically unexplained symptoms (Brown, 2004).
To summarize, perception is not measurement and the impact
of the emotions and contextual variables on perception is not
measurement error nor a flaw in perception. Keeping perception
and perceptual bias context dependent and tuned-in to situational
shifts in costs and benefits is an important skill, not a defect (Lynn
and Barrett, 2014; Petersen et al., 2015).
Anxiety as “Uneasiness of the Mind”
Predictive coding models give up the notion of an agent
or self on a superordinate level that supervises perception,
but conceptualize perception as representation of statistical
regularities in stimulation (Hohwy, 2012). This idea can be
traced back to Hume (1739/2007) who proposed that the mind
constructs perceiver and percept at the same time. If perception
is not coordinated by a self, but the self is a consequence of
perception, affective states such as anxiety need to be considered
not as something a self “has,” but as part of the data processing
algorithms. In this process, the uneasiness of the mind is a reaction
to the challenge to integrate unspecific, disconnected, and often
inconsistent experiences. Hume (1739/2007, Book I Part IV)
suggests that in response to this challenge “the mind is bound to
be uneasy and to seek relief from that uneasiness” by constructing
a self that is the illusion of a continuous existence. This self -in an
illusion of agency- can feel and try to evade threats to its existence.
Hume’s uneasiness of the mind has been rediscovered by recent
theory development. Negative affect has been conceptualized as
resulting from a mismatch between predicted stimulation and
experienced stimulation (Joffily and Coricelli, 2013) or as a
response to reduction of prediction error at a rate that is lower
than expected (Van de Cruys, 2014). We suggest that another
important way in which anxiety may be inherent to algorithms of
data processing is as decision rule for solving the infinity problem
(e.g., Chater andVitányi, 2003). From the limited data provided by
our senses, the brain could create an infinite number of patterns
of experiences. Thus, a central problem in experience is which
rules the brain applies to choose those experiential categories that
are most useful in a pragmatic sense, that is, condensed enough
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to facilitate perception and not too condensed to miss important
details (Reed, 1972; Anderson, 1991).
We propose that negative affect may lead to an over-emphasis
on simplicity and reduction of redundancy to the point of loss
of unique data. This can be adaptive in situations in which
fast information processing is crucial. If excessive simplification
becomes a habitual processing style, this may lead to serious
reduction of predictive power.
More specifically, we propose that negative affect and anxiety
impact on perceived homogeneity of sensation categories
(Petersen et al., 2014b, 2015). Categories are defined by both (1) a
central tendency and (2) dispersion of stimuli around this point.
The dispersion determines how much confidence the brain can
have in inferences based on a category prototype. Animal studies
suggest that confidence estimates (i.e., estimates of stimulus
dispersion) do not require meta-cognition (e.g., Hampton, 2001;
Foote and Crystal, 2007; Kepecs et al., 2008).
A homogeneous category acts as precise prior, that is, a
likelihood distribution with small dispersion. Lower perceived
variability within a category may lead to more extensive
generalization of information about the category to new stimuli
(e.g., Shepard, 1987; Zaman et al., 2015). We suggest that negative
affect is related to a tendency to process the broad picture in
categorical terms and less on a single stimulus basis (Robinson
and Clore, 2002), resulting in more extensive generalization of
category-information, and in the case of aversive categories, fear-
generalization.
Biological history has shaped the structure and function of
the brain to give priority to deriving valence from stimulation,
dividing sensations very broadly in “good” or “bad” to make
affective predictions (Barrett and Bar, 2009). In the case of
aversive interoceptive stimuli such as pain or breathlessness,
highly homogeneous categories allow nearly instant predictions
and affective evaluations with high confidence. This allows fast
activation of coping behavior with little or no sensory analysis
(Petersen et al., 2015). Thus, processing data at a highly condensed
category level and ignoring seemingly redundant informationmay
provide a subjective feeling of relief, at least in the short-term,
because it allows avoidance of direct stimulus processing. It may
help to create and defend a feeling of certainty in the face of
ambiguous information (Quellar et al., 2006; Petersen et al., 2015).
To summarize, we propose that affect does not only guide data
collection in terms of quantity, attention, and speed (Thayer and
Lane, 2000; Koster et al., 2004; Cisler and Koster, 2010), but that
affect sets a threshold for the degree to which information is
condensed and how strongly it is edited to fit into categories.
As threshold mechanism, affect may determine the extent
to which information is eliminated as redundant or irrelevant
and it may determine when information seeking is aborted in
favor of a decision based on priors and prototypes. Thus, we
propose a modified vigilance avoidance model (e.g., Mogg and
Bradley, 1998) in which negative affect is not related to absolute
avoidance of stimulation, but to a shift from more detailed
processing to highly condensed prototypes. Thus, high processing
priority for interoceptive stimuli inmore anxious individuals (e.g.,
Domschke et al., 2010) may not lead to more rigorous testing
of incoming sensory stimulation. In threat-sensitive persons
negative affective predictionsmay initiate the application of overly
condensed category-related information and more aggressive
stimulus disambiguation by using category information. Focus
on condensed category prototypes in turn will make detection of
details less likely that would be needed to update categories with
regard to central tendency and dispersion.
Taking Inferential Leaps Between Branches
of the Perceptual Tree
Predictive coding approaches place a particular emphasis on brain
hierarchies involved in building a representation of the world
(e.g., Friston, 2005; Edwards et al., 2012). Lower levels of this
hierarchy predict basic sensory attributes in the form of fast and
automatic inferences, which are usually gated out of awareness
(e.g., breathing sensations at rest). More complex inferences are
suggested to be passed on to higher brain structures and—passing
the gate of conscious processing—implicit priors may become
explicit hypotheses (Hohwy, 2012).
Categorization models equally emphasize hierarchy (Kemp
et al., 2007). We propose a continuum ranging from sensory
grouping to perceptual grouping to explicit categorization. On the
lowest level, at the interface between world and senses, anatomy
of the sensory system will group stimulation and process it in a
limited number of afferent systems. This processingwill be further
subjected to perceptual grouping (patterns of stimulation in space
and time) and categorization at a central level leading to conscious
perception of bodily sensations.
Interoception, just as exteroception, means taking “inductive
leaps given very sparse data” (Kemp et al., 2007). Leaps may
be made in both directions, from sensation levels to conclusion
about categories, or from categories to sensations. Interoceptive
categories are seldom fully distinct and misclassification (leaps to
the wrong branch) can easily occur. Figure 1 illustrates overlap
between interoceptive categories using the example of asthma and
sports. Mistaking breathlessness during exercise as a symptom
of respiratory disease may lead to exercise avoidance, reduced
physical fitness, and disease aggravation (Wanrooij et al., 2014).
Asthma and panic are another example of two distinct
categories that overlap strongly at the symptom level. Breathing
sensations such as a tight chest and feelings of suffocation occur
during asthma andpanic attacks (Lehrer et al., 2002).While taking
asthma medication (short-acting beta agonists) during an asthma
attack alleviates symptoms, sensations induced by this medication
such as increased heartbeat and tremor (Salpeter et al., 2004) may
aggravate panic. If etiologically distinct symptom categories that
require distinct courses of action overlap experientially, inferences
based on the “wrong” priors/prototypes may be useless or even
harmful. Again, we suggest that this applies to priors on all levels.
Indices of Perceived Category
Homogeneity and Complexity
We propose that affect increases (1) perceived homogeneity of
interoceptive categories and confidence in information inferred
from these categories, (2) their subjective accentuation, and
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FIGURE 1 | Level 4 presents the concept dyspnea as superordinate category, Level 3 presents examples of subordinate categories that can define the
superordinate category on Level 4. Level 2 and 1 represent the variability of experience within each subordinate category. Level y presents the level of sensory
data. Please note that for the sake of simplicity, we present only three of the multiple experiential categories which may be included in the experience of dyspnea.
Please note also that this example represents the experience reported by one single person and is not intended to be a general model of dyspnea perception.
(3) the impact of these precise priors on perception. Testing
dispersion of categories of bodily sensations rather than mean
values is a new methodological approach that allows testing
innovative hypotheses brought forward by recent predictive
coding models. Placing our model in a categorization framework
has the advantage that these as yet untested hypotheses can be
targetedwith established paradigms and statistics developed in the
long-standing tradition of categorization research.
To calculate homogeneity of a sensation category, parameters
such as standard deviation (SD), coefficient of variation, or range
can be computed (Park and Judd, 1990; Boldry et al., 2007;
Petersen et al., 2014b). SDs are usually higher for higher means
and the coefficient of variation -as the ratio of SD divided by
the mean—is recommended if mean values underlying SDs differ
widely.
Furthermore, individual slopes across categories allow
estimating perceived category variability (for a tutorial on
individual slopes analysis, see Pfister et al., 2013). In this analysis,
the location of the stimulus on the dimension underlying the
category is used to predict, for example, self-report of stimulus
intensity or unpleasantness. Steeper slopes indicate stronger
differentiation between stimuli (Petersen et al., 2015). Studies are
missing that test the effect of trait and state affect on perceived
homogeneity within sensation categories, but we expect negative
affect and anxiety to be related to lower dispersion (less steep
slopes) and to stronger generalization.
Direct similarity ratings or confusion frequencies between
stimuli within categories (e.g., Shepard, 1987) allow to compute
category homogeneity without explicitly defining dimensions
of experience (e.g., Borg and Groenen, 2005; Petersen et al.,
2008). Similarity ratings and confusion frequencies can be
analyzed in a signal detection approach calculating sensitivity
for differences within and between categories and decision
criteria. These approaches have been used in studies on
interoceptive categorization using respiratory stimuli. Results
suggest that individuals high in habitual symptom report and
negative affect accentuate stronger between-category differences
and show more liberal decision strategies (Petersen et al.,
2015).
Furthermore, perceived overlap of sensation categories can be
assessed using overlap-indices (Rafaeli-Mor et al., 1999). As an
example, we calculated overlap, defined as average communality,
for the data given in Figure 1. In this example, one person
has selected twelve descriptors to describe dyspnea during
“exercise” and 10 descriptors for dyspnea related to “asthma.” Five
descriptors were used to describe both situations. Mean overlap is
calculated as OL = (5/12+5/10)/2 = 0.46 indicating a perceived
overlap of 46%. Depression has been suggested to be related to
lower complexity in self-perception (Rafaeli-Mor et al., 1999), but
we are not aware of research testing the relationship of anxiety,
negative affect, or depression with blurred category boundaries in
the perception of bodily sensations.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 14084
Petersen et al. Interoception and the uneasiness of the mind
Other analytical strategies to test for differentiation between
sensation categories include contingency tables. Taking the
example in Figure 1, a 2  2 table can be drawn including in
its cells the number of attributes that have been assigned only
to one of the two categories or are shared by both categories.
Chi2 for this 2  2 table is X2 = 4.96, p = 0.026 indicating that
the attribution of descriptors to the two situations is significantly
different from a random distribution. Other indices such as
Cramer’s V orPhi allow to analyze distributions of attributes across
contingency tables larger than 2  2 (Showers, 1992). They range
between 0 and 1with 1 indicating complete compartmentalization
of attributes. In the example of Figure 1, Cramer’s V = 0.54,
indicating moderate differentiation between exercise and asthma
in the choice of descriptors.
Conclusion
Theories developed over the last centuries are in agreement
about the relative and autonomous character of perception. We
propose that this new perspective can be fruitfully applied to
empirical paradigms using category homogeneity as estimate of
confidence of the brain in perceptual inferences and predictions.
This perspective may allow testing how affect is inherent to the
perceptual process.
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